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INTRODUCTION 
Death comes to everyone. However, in our society, due to great 
advances in medical knowledge and technology over the last few de-
cades, death does not come suddenly or completely unexpectedly to 
most people. . . . Sophisticated life-sustaining medical technology 
has made it possible to hold some people on the threshold of death 
for an indeterminate period of time, "obfuscat[ing] the use of tradi-
tional definition of death." ... Questions of fate have thereby be-
come matters of choice raising profound "moral, social, technologi-
cal, philosophical, and legal questions involving the interplay of 
many disciplines. " 1 
The "right-to-die" movement has come a long way since the Karen 
Quinlan2 case captured our attention a decade ago.8 In the last twelve 
years, courts and state legislatures, together with health care profes-
• Associate Professor of Law and Director, Law and Health Care Program, Uni-
versity of Maryland School of Law. B.A. 1973, Princeton University; M.P.A. 1974, 
Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University; J.D. 
1979, University of Virginia. 
I. In re Farrell, 529 A.2d 404, 406 (N.J. 1987) (quoting In re Quinlan, 355 
A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976), and In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 
(N.J. 1985)). 
2. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). 
3. The same year that the Quinlan decision was handed down, California en-
acted the first Natural Death Act, granting statutory recognition to the "living will." A 
living will is a legally executed document that sets forth an individual's wishes not to 
receive "life-sustaining" treatment in the event the individual suffers a "terminal condi-
tion" and becomes incapable of making such decisions. For an excellent state by state 
analysis of Jiving will legislation, see SOCIETY FOR THE RIGHT TO DIE, HANDBOOK OF 
LIVING WILL LAWS (1987) [hereinafter HANDBOOK]. 
575 
HeinOnline -- 33 St. Louis U. L.J. 576 1988-1989
576 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 33:575 
sionals, hospitals, medical ethicists, legal scholars, and the public, have 
continued to address the legal and ethical issues raised by foregoing 
life-sustaining treatment. Although progress has been made in opening 
up debate and reaching a consensus on many of the issues, and some 
legal trends have emerged, many questions still remain. 
While courts have had little trouble affording the right to forego 
treatment to competent persons,• the more difficult challenge has been 
how to exercise similar rights on behalf of incompetent patients.C1 The 
majority of state courts that have addressed the issue of an incompe-
tent patient's right to forego life-sustaining treatment have permitted a 
surrogate decisionmaker to make the decision for the incompetent pa-
tient who is in a permanently unconscious, persistent vegetative state, 
or in the last stages of a terminal illness.8 The more difficult cases, 
however, arise when an incompetent, severely debilitated person is 
neither permanently unconscious nor terminally ill.7 For these patients, 
many of whom are elderly and languishing in nursing homes or similar 
institutions, quality of life judgments cannot be ignored in the surro-
gate decisionmaking process.8 
To date, only a few cases have addressed the right to forego life-
sustaining treatment for patients who are severely debilitated. These 
few cases, however, reveal the problems which courts and other deci-
sionmakers face when confronted with these questions. A delicate bal-
ance must be drawn between upholding a patient's right to forego life-
sustaining treatment and any tendency on the part of the surrogate 
decisionmaker to confuse the social worth of a person's continued life 
with the worth of life to the patient. 
This Article will first discuss the legal and ethical foundations that 
support the right to forego life-sustaining treatment. Section II will ap-
ply this right specifically to the competent patient. In Section III the 
greater challenge of how to preserve such a right for the incompetent 
patient will be analyzed.' The final section will apply evolving legal 
standards to the elderly, severely debilitated patient, asserting that the 
best way society can deal with this difficult area is to squarely face 
4. See infra notes 40-52 and accompanying text. 
5. See infra notes 53-107 and accompanying text. 
6. SeeN. CANTOR, LEGAL FRONTIERS OF DEATH AND DYING 91-96 (1987); see 
also In re Guardianship of Grant, 747 P.2d 445 (Wash. 1987) (en bane); Merritt, 
Equality for the Elderly Incompetent: A Proposal for Dignified Death, 39 STAN. L. 
REV. 689, 698 ( 1987). 
7. See N. CANTOR, supra note 6, at 96. 
8. See Merritt, supra note 6, at 712. 
9. An incompetent patient may have been formerly competent or never compe-
tent, such as the mentally retarded. The special problems of minor patients and se-
verely defective newborns raise many unique legal and ethical issues and are beyond 
the scope of this Article. See Rothenberg, Medical Decision Making for Children, 1 
8IO. LAW 149 (1986). 
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quality of life judgments. 
I. THE RIGHT TO FOREGO TREATMENT: LEGAL & ETHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS 
It is well established in the medical and legal community, as well 
as with the public at large, that a pati~nt has the right to forego life-
sustaining treatment. Both the common law right to self-determination 
and bodily integrity and the constitutional right to privacy provide the 
legal foundation for this right to forego medical treatment. "No right is 
held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, 
than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his 
own person, free from all restraint or interference by others, unless by 
clear and unquestionable authority of law."10 This common law right is 
recognized in both criminal and tort law. 
Beginning in the 1960s, courts expanded their recognition of self-
determination in the context of medical treatment to the development 
of the doctrine of informed consent. This tort doctrine establishes a 
duty whereby health care providers must inform the patient of treat-
ment alternatives and risks prior to obtaiping valid consent. Informed 
consent has evolved to where the right not to consent to or forego treat-
ment has been incorporated into the doctrine. This incorporation en-
ables all individuals to fully realize their right to self-determination.11 
As the law of informed consent evolved, the New Jersey Supreme 
Court in the Quinlan case established another legal source for uphold-
ing the right to forego life-sustaining treatment: the constitutional right 
to privacy.12 Although the United States Constitution fails to explicitly 
mention a right to privacy, the Quinlan court reasoned that if the 
United States Supreme Court could recognize such a right to protect 
the individual from state action which would limit such personal 
choices as contraception/8 and a woman's decision to terminate her 
pregnancy under certain conditions, 14 the right to privacy would also be 
broad enough to encompass a patient's decision to decline medical 
10. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891); see Rasmussen v. 
Fleming, 741 P.2d 674 (Ariz. 1987) (en bane); In re Welfare of Colyer, 660 P.2d 738 
(Wash. 1983). 
II. See, e.g .. In re Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr .. 840 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 109 S. 
Ct. 399 (1988); In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947 (Me. 1987). But cf Cruzan v. Harmon, 
760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988) (en bane), cert, granted, 109 S.Ct. 3240 (1989) (positing 
that in the absence of capacity to understand and decide, "neither consent nor refusal 
can be informed"). 
12. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). 
13. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
14. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). For an outstanding article criticizing 
the "waxing-and-waning" right of privacy borrowed from Roe v. Wade, see Capron, 
Borrowed Lessons: The Role of Ethical Distinctions in Framing Law on Life-Sus-
taining Treatment, 1984 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 647. 
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treatment.16 The Quinlan court determined that a patient in a persis-
tent vegetative state, with no reasonable chance of recovery, had the 
right to have the respirator sustaining her life withdrawn. Since the 
patient remained in a coma, unable· to express her wishes, the court 
allowed her guardian and family to act on her behalf in exercising her 
right to forego further life-sustaining treatment,I6 
The court did recognize that this right is not absolute and that it 
must be balanced against the claimed interests of the state in the 
"preservation and sanctity of human life and defense of the right of the 
physician to administer medical care according to his best judgment."17 
As more state courts faced similar cases, four state interests emerged: 
(1) the preservation of life; (2) the prevention of suicide; (3) protection 
of innocent third parties; and ( 4) protection of the ethical integrity of 
the medical profession.18 
The most important state interest, at least in theory, is the preser-
vation of life. In practice, most courts have found that this interest in 
preserving life would not outweigh the right of a patient to refuse life-
sustaining treatment,l9 Suicide prevention is generally not an issue in 
right to die cases, primarily because the patient does not inflict the 
illness deliberately on herself. If the patient has no minor children or 
the family consents, the third interest in protecting innocent parties is 
usually not at issue. Finally, the ethical standards of the medical pro-
fession have evolved since Quinlan to a point where a large proportion 
of the profession supports the right of the patient to refuse treatment.20 
The United States Supreme Court has yet to hear a case involving 
the right to forego treatment.21 However, the Court's interpretation of 
15. 355 A.2d at 662-63; see Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580 (D.R.I. 1988) 
(first federal court to decide that the constitutional right of privacy encompassed the 
right to decline life-sustaining treatment). But cf Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 418. (expres-
sing "grave doubts as to the applicability of privacy rights to decisions to terminate the 
provision of food and water to an incompetent patient"). 
16. Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 647. 
17. /d. at 663; accord Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. at 588. 
18. See, e.g., Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 370 
N .E.2d 417, 425 (Mass. 1977). 
19. The Cruzan case, however, contended that other courts had allowed "con-
cerns with the quality of life to discount the state's interest in life." Cruzan, 760 
S.W.2d at 421. The Missouri Supreme Court held: "[T]he state's interest is not in 
quality of life. The State's interest is an unqualified interest in life." /d. at 422. Cruzan 
ultimately held that the state's interest in the patient's life outweighed any right to 
refuse treatment. /d. at 424. Although Ms. Cruzan remained in a persistent vegetative 
state, the court deemed her "not dead" nor "terminally ill." /d. The court went on to 
determined that "[h]er life expectancy is thirty years." Id. 
20. See, e.g., Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580 (D.R.I. 1988); In re Welfare of 
Colyer, 660 P.2d 738, 743-44 (Wash. 1983). 
21. Writ of certiorari has been granted in the Cruzan case. 109 S.Ct. 3240 
(1989). 
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the constitutional right to privacy should extend to recognition of such 
a right.22 Absent a decision by the Supreme Court, state and federal 
courts have addressed the issue and established a right to the point 
where it is protected by both the common law and the constitutional 
right to privacy.23 Both of these legal sources provide the legal founda-
tion for promoting the values of self-determination, bodily integrity, 
and personal autonomy in medical decisionmaking. 
To a great extent, the evolution of medical ethics has influenced 
the development of law in this area. In the early 1980s, the President's 
Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Behav-
ioral Research released an influential series of reports, including one 
entitled, "Deciding to Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment."24 The report 
established that there should be no ethical or legal distinction between 
withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining treatment.211 Subsequent 
judicial decisions and commentaries endorsed the position that the right 
to forego treatment includes both the withdrawing and withholding of 
treatment.26 
Historically, physicians and health care institutions believed-and 
many still do-that the act of withdrawing a respirator or removing a 
feeding tube entails an affirmative act which accelerates the dying pro-
cess.27 Those adhering to this view believe that once this treatment has 
been initiated, it must continue, regardless of its value to the patient. 
On the other hand, these same commentators and practitioners find the 
initial withholding of such treatment ethically and legally permissible. 
In fact, it is often more difficult to know how a patient will re-
22. See Gray, 697 F. Supp. at 585. The advantage of constitutional protection is 
that a constitutional right can only be abrogated by a compelling state interest, which 
would be rare under most circumstances. On the other hand, a common law right can 
be abrogated by statute. Some commentators, however, consider the common law right 
more helpful for patients since they do not need to assert state action and have an 
opportunity for collecting damages under tort law. SeeN. CANTOR, supra note 6, at 6. 
23. See, e.g., Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Ct. App. 1986), 
later proceeding, 241 Cal. Rptr. 239 (Ct. App. 1987); Foody v. Manchester Memorial 
Hosp., 482 A.2d 713 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1984); In re Guardianship of Grant, 747 P.2d 
445 (Wash. 1987); In re Welfare of Colyer, 660 P.2d 738 (Wash. 1983). 
24. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN 
MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE· 
SUSTAINING TREATMENT (1983) (hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COMM'N]. 
25. /d. 
26. See, e.g., THE HASTINGS CENTER, GUIDELINES ON THE TERMINATION OF 
LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT AND THE CARE OF THE DYING 130-31 (1988) (hereinaf-
ter THE HASTINGS CENTER GUIDELINES]. 
27. Such a characterization, however, should be distinguished from "mercy kill-
ing" or "active" euthanasia, a subject beyond the scope of this Article. For an excellent 
set of articles on euthanasia, see Fletcher, The Courts and Euthanasia 15 L. MED. & 
HEALTH CARE 223, 223-41 (1988), and Glantz, Withholding and Withdrawing Treat-
ment: The Role of Criminal Law, 15 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 231 (1988). 
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spond to a treatment without a time-limited trial. This remains particu-
larly true for the emergency patient. Accordingly, it may be contrary to 
medical standards to avoid placing a patient on a respirator or inserting 
a feeding tube merely because of the incorrect belief that such proce-
dures could not be terminated. As the New Jersey Supreme Court 
noted in the Conroy decision, ss such a distinction could in fact discour-
age families and physicians from even attempting certain types of care 
and thereby force them into hasty and premature decisions to allow a 
patient to die.29 To date, only Ohio has suggested that different proce-
dures are required for withdrawing and withholding treatment and only 
the Mississippi living will statute authorizes withdrawal of treatment 
explicitly, but nowhere expressly provides for withholding treatment.30 
The evolution of ethical standards has also influenced the legal pa-
rameters of defining life-sustaining treatment. Historically, courts ad-
hered to a distinction between extraordinary and ordinary care.31 A pa-
tient or her surrogate could refuse those treatments labeled 
extraordinary, but not those deemed ordinary.32 Within the last five 
years, the focus has shifted to the withholding or withdrawal of artifi-
cial feeding and hydration. Adopting the position of the President's 
Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Behav-
ioral Research, the courts have either expanded the definition of ex-
traordinary to include artificial feeding and hydration or abandoned the 
distinction as unhelpful and confusing altogether.33 
To date, courts in over thirteen states have ruled that no difference 
28. In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985). 
29. /d. at 1234. 
30. SOCIETY FOR THE RIGHT TO DIE, THE PHYSICIAN AND THE HOPELESSLY ILL 
PATIENT 30 (1985). 
31. See Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580, 588 (D.R.l. 1988) ("courts have dis-
tinguished between ordinary and extraordinary treatment"). 
32. In the Quinlan case, the mechanical respirator was labeled as an extraordi-
nary treatment. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). 
33. PRESIDENT's COMM'N, supra note 24, encouraged this position and THE HAS· 
TINGS CENTER GUIDELINES, supra note 26, affirmed it. See also Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. 
Supp. 580, 588 (D.R.l. 1988) ("recent decisions have criticized the distinction as one 
without meaning"). 
The courts have also been influenced by an opinion issued by the AMA Council on 
Ethical and Judicial Affairs. The opinion stated that it is ethically permissible to with· 
hold all life-prolonging treatment, including artificial nutrition and hydration, from 
permanently unconscious or dying patients in accordance with their wishes or those of 
their surrogates. Withholding or Withdrawing Life Prolonging Medical Treatment, 
CURRENT OPINIONS OF THE COUNSEL OF ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS OF THE 
AMA § 2.18 (1986); see a/so SOCIETY FOR THE RIGHT TO DIE, supra note 30, at 43 
(Supp. 1988). State medical societies, including those in Massachusetts and California, 
have issued similar opinions. /d. The Hastings Center Guidelines also support the right 
of both the incompetent and competent patient to have artificial feeding and hydration, 
as well as the administration of antibiotics, withheld or withdrawn when not necessary 
for comfort care. THE HASTINGS CENTER GUIDELINES, supra note 26, at 66. 
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exists between the right to refuse artificial feeding and hydration and 
the right to refuse other forms of medical treatment.34 A number of 
state courts have adopted the New Jersey Supreme Court's position in 
Conroy: "Analytically, artificial feeding by means of a nasogastric tube 
or intravenous infusion can be seen as equivalent to artificial breathing 
by means of a respirator. Both prolong life through mechanical means 
when the body is no longer able to perform a vital bodily function on 
its own."311 Although the common law has moved forward in this area, 
there is still much confusion on this issue.36 
Another life-sustaining treatment worthy of particular attention is 
cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR). Traditionally, many hospitals 
acted as if there was a "Do Not Resuscitate" (DNR) order for a hope-
lessly ill patient, but failed to document it in the chart. The decision 
whether to resuscitate was often not discussed with the patient or the 
surrogate. Rather, it was handled as a medical decision within the dis-
cretion of the attending physician and not as a decision for the patient 
or her guardian. A number of state medical societies, the New York 
state legislature, and the Joint Commission for the Accreditation of 
Hospitals (JCAH) have recently addressed this issue.37 
For a hopelessly ill, yet competent patient, the emerging standard 
allows the patient to decide whether a DNR order should be issued, 
based upon the patient's understanding of mediCal diagnosis and prog-
34. SOCIETY FOR THE RIGHT TO DIE, supra note 30. But cf Cruzan v. Harmon, 
760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988) (en bane) (reversing trial court, which allowed co-guardi-
ans' request to withdraw nutrition and hydration from incompetent ward in vegetative 
state, because public policy mandated the prohibition of such withdrawal under all 
circumstances). 
35. In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1236 (N.J. 1985). 
36. Ironically, part of the confusion centers around the living will statutes. For a 
general discussion of living wills, see infra notes 88-93 and accompanying text. Six 
states clearly indicate that an advanced directive can provide for the withdrawal of 
artificial feeding not necessary for comfort care. Seven other states explicitly exclude it 
as a procedure that may be rejected. A number of other state statutes provide that food 
and water may not be rejected, but do not specifically define artificial feeding and 
hydration. Other statutes make no mention of the issue at all. See HANDBOOK, supra 
note 3, at 6-7. In spite of the confusion, state courts in Florida, Maine, and Colorado 
have addressed the issue and held that restrictive statutes cannot be read to limit the 
constitutional and common law rights of patients to have artificial feeding tubes with-
drawn. !d. at 7. The lower court in Cruzan affirmed this view, but the Missouri Su-
preme Court overturned this decision. Cruzan v. Harmon, 160 S.W. 2d. 408, 410 (Mo. 
1988) (en bane). 
37. As of January I, 1989, JCAH standards require hospitals to have in place 
policies and procedures for reaching decisions on resuscitative services, including ade-
quate provisions for protection of the patient's rights. JOINT CoMMISSION ON AccREDI-
TATION OF HOSPITALS, ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS (1988); see N.Y. 
PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2960 (McKinney Supp. 1989) ("appropriate for an attending 
physician, in certain circumstances, to issue an order not to [resuscitate] where appro-
priate consent has been obtained.") (emphasis added). 
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nosis. In other words, the DNR order should be treated like all other 
medical decisions in which the patient has the right to refuse a life-
sustaining treatment. 38 If the patient is not competent, the decision 
should be reached after consultation between the physician and family 
members or the legal guardian.39 
Thus, for the competent patient, exercising the right to have life-
sustaining treatment withheld or withdrawn should be relatively easy. 
The patient decides and communicates his decision to the health care 
provider. For the patient without such capacity, exercising such a right 
is more problematic. The application of the right for a competent pa-
tient will be addressed first. 
II. THE COMPETENT PATIENT: THE "CAPACITY" TO FOREGO 
TREATMENT 
All patients are presumed to be competent. Legally, only a court 
has the authority to declare a person "incompetent." In practice, a pa-
tient is competent or, more accurately, has the capacity to make treat-
ment decisions, when she can understand the relevant information, re-
flect on it in accordance with her values and goals, and communicate 
with caregivers.40 Most often a person makes this decision with little 
trouble. Yet problems arise when fear, mental illness, or physical illness 
cloud a patient's judgment. In practice, if a patient remains in an inca-
pacitated state due to a temporary condition,41 any determination on 
competency and treatment decisions should be postponed, if at all 
possible. 
Very few court decisions have clearly defined the terms "capacity 
to consent to" or "refuse treatment." Most state legislatures, however, 
have established procedures for a court to determine a person's legal 
competency. Generally, the courts are wary about second-guessing the 
choice of a patient. Even if a patient's refusal of treatment seems irra-
tional to the physician, this does not necessarily mean that the patient 
is incompetent. A patient may be depressed, have periods of confusion 
and a distorted sense of time, yet still retain the capability to under-
stand the consequences of the decision to refuse treatment. In this type 
38. In re Dinnerstein, 380 N.E.2d 134 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978) (first decision to 
uphold the validity of the "no code" or DNR order for the incompetent patient). 
39. Once a decision is made, it should be documented in the medical record. Any 
significant improvement would void the order. See supra note 37. 
40. THE HASTINGS CENTER GuiDELINES, supra note 26, at 23. These recent ethi-
cal guidelines represent consensus by an interdisciplinary group of experts. The guide-
lines build on the important and influential work of the President's Commission for the 
Study of Ethical Problems in Medical and Biomedical and Behavioral Research. See 
supra note 24. 
41. Such temporary conditions might result from severe pain, medication, intoxi-
cation, or withdrawal. 
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of case, most courts will not declare the patient incompetent.42 
A diagnosed mental illness or even commitment to a mental insti-
tution does not mean that a patient is per se incompetent to refuse 
treatment, as long as she understands the consequences of the deci-
sion.43 Although the reasonableness of the decision to refuse treatment 
is not the standard for competency, in practice, the nature of the treat-
ment and the prognosis may influence whether the health care provider 
takes the issue to court and whether the court deems the patient 
incompetent."" 
In most cases, the determination of competency is not at issue. 
Recent state court decisions have affirmed the competent patient's right 
to refuse treatment, regardless of prognosis.411 Consistent with the rea-
soning behind the doctrine of informed consent, the health care pro-
vider is to honor the refusal of the patient. A California court held that 
an incurable, but not terminally ill patient had a right to be withdrawn 
from a respirator even if that action would hasten his death."6 The 
court held that to do otherwise would frustrate the very essence of the 
right of informed consent and the constitutional right to privacy.47 
In the much-publicized Bouvia case,"8 the same California court 
affirmed its position and held that a quadriplegic, who was not termi-
nally ill, had the right to order the withdrawal of a nasogastric feeding 
tube, even if the action would hasten or cause her death.'9 The court 
found that such a decision was neither medical nor legal, and that the 
patient alone should make the decision. 110 More recently, the New 
Jersey Supreme Court declared that a competent woman with an incur-
able neurological disease, but for whom death was not imminent, had 
the right to have a respirator removed at home.111 The court recognized 
42. See, e.g., Lane v. Candura, 376 N.E.2d 1232 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978) (finding 
a seventy-seven year old diabetic competent to refuse amputation of her leg because 
she did want to be an invalid or live in nursing home); In re Quackenbush, 383 A.2d 
785 (N.J. Super. 1978) (seventy-two year old competent patient refused to have her 
gangrenous legs amputated). 
43. See, e.g., In re Maida Yetter, 62 Pa. D. & C.2d 619 (Northampton County 
Ct. 1973) (patient permitted to refuse surgical biopsy for breast cancer if the patient 
understood that consequences of the decision might be death). But cf State Dep't of 
Human Servs. v. Northern, 563 S.W.2d 197 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978) (finding patient not 
competent to decide to refuse amputation of feet because he could not accept fact that 
his feet were infected). 
44. For an outline of this issue, see M. MACDONALD, K. MEYER & B. EssiG, 
HEALTH CARE LAw. A PRACTICAL GUIDE § 18.04-.05 (I 987). 
45. See infra notes 46-52. 
46. Bartling v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (Ct. App. 1984). 
47. !d. 
48. Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Ct. App. 1987). 
49. /d. at 306. 
50. Id. at 305. 
51. In re Farrell, 529 A.2d 404 (N.J. 1987). 
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that her life was filled with pain and that it would be unfair and unjust 
to force her to live any longer.112 
Ill. THE INCOMPETENT PATIENT: How TO EXERCISE THE RIGHT? 
Most of the "right-to-die" cases in the last decade have not in-
volved competent patients. Not surprisingly, the doctrine of informed 
consent has protected the right of the competent patient to refuse treat-
ment, and the right has been accepted by both the medical and legal 
communities. Courts, however, have been presented with the challenge 
of defining the parameters of the right of the patient incapable of mak-
ing her own treatment decisions. Although state courts decide each 
case on a unique set of facts and state laws vary, certain trends do 
emerge on the two major issues at stake: ( 1) who should be the appro-
priate surrogate decisionmaker? and ·(2) what decisionmaking . stan-
dards should be applied? 
A. Who Should Decide? 
Traditionally, the physician relied on the family113 to assist in mak~ 
ing medical decisions for the incompetent patient. This medical custom 
makes sense given the family's unique relationship with the patient. As 
the Quinlan court pointed out, it is the family who is most knowledgea-
ble and concerned with the welfare of the patient. Thus, the next of kin 
is recognized as a suitable decisionmaker.114 Of course, it is possible 
that family memqers may have different values and therefore may be 
unable to separate financial or emotional concerns from appropriate 
decisionmaking. But absent;a· showing. of bad faith or a physician's be-
lief that the family does not have the best welfare of the patient in 
mind, the family should be the primary decisionmaker. 
Until very recently, the only way to free the physician or institu-
tion from potential civil or criminal liability for withdrawing or with~ 
holding life-sustaining treatment based on a family member's consent 
was to go to court/111 either to have a family member appointed as a 
52. Id. 
53. The traditional definition of the family may not be appropriate in a number 
of circumstances. For example, does a homosexual AIDS patient's family include the 
patient's cohabitant of ten years? 
54. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 670 (N.J.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). 
55. To date, no one has successfully brought criminal charges against a physician 
or health care institution for withdrawing life-sustaining treatment, including the re-
moval of a feeding tube. See Barber v. Superior Court of California, 195 Cal. Rptr. 
484 (Ct. App. 1983) (dismissed criminal charges against physicians for removal of 
feeding tube). For an excellent article on criminal liability and its application to this 
area see Glantz, supra note 27. Nor has there been a single reported case of civil 
liability in which a physician was found negligent pursuant to a family's request to 
withdraw or withhold life-sustaining treatment. However, there have been a few re-
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guardian or to obtaip judicial approval of the decision itself. 56 Unfortu-
nately, going to court is burdensome, expensive, and inappropriate in 
most cases, since the court is ill-equipped to make such personal and 
complex ethical decisions.57 In recent years at least half of the states in 
response to this problem have explicitly authorized by statute or court 
opinion the family of adult patients to authorize termination of treat-
ment without going to court.58 
Within the last two years, the New Jersey Supreme Court has set 
out comprehensive guidelines for family decisionmaking.59 That court 
declared the family as the primary decisionmaker, in spite of the fact 
that New Jersey had no statute on point.60 The court also stated that 
with concurrence by the attending physicians and confirmation of the 
medical condition from two independent physicians, the family, without 
a court order, had the right to refuse treatment on behalf of the incom-
petent patient.61 The family need not present clear and convincing evi-
ported cases recently in which courts have recognized a battery action for damages for 
failure to abide by the wishes of the patient or her family for withholding or withdraw-
ing treatment. The Ohio Court of Appeals held that maintaining a comatose woman on 
a respirator without her consent was actionable battery. Leach v. Shapiro, 469 N .E.2d 
1047 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984). California also recognized a cause of action, including the 
payment of attorneys' fees (under its private attorney general statute), for a hospital's 
failure to remove the respirator of a competent patient after his informed request that 
it be removed. Bartling v. Glendale Adventist Medical Center, 228 Cal. Rptr. 847 (Ct. 
App. 1986). In Bouvia v. Los Angeles County, 241 Cal. Rptr. 239 (Ct. App. 1987), the 
California court permitted a cause of action for damages based on feeding the patient 
against her will. 
In practice, plaintiffs have difficulty winning these .types of cases against health 
care providers. The difficulty arises because the provider may seem very sympathetic, it 
may be hard to prove knowing disregard for the patient's wishes, and damages are very 
difficult to assess. The possibility of obtaining payment for attorney fees, however, may 
be enough of an incentive to honor the patient's decision or that of his surrogate deci-
sionmaker to refuse treatment. 
56. Generally, the trend has been to remove noncontroversial cases from the 
court's jurisdiction. Yet a number of cases will continue to come to court. Based on 
their assessment of liability risk, health care providers will continue to either seek the 
court's protection prior to terminating treatment or force families to get judicial ap-
proval. A court may then order health care providers to honor the family's right to 
refuse life-sustaining treatment on behalf of the incompetent family member. A misun-
derstanding of the law and a fear of liability continue to pervade medical practice in 
this area. For greater insight into this area, see Areen, The Legal Status of Consent 
Obtained From Families of Adult Patients to Withhold or Withdraw Treatment, 258 
J. A.M.A. 229, 231 (1987). See Letters to the Editor, 258 J. A.M.A. 2696-97 (1987). 
57. Areen, supra note 56, at 233. 
58. /d. at 230. 
59. See In re Jobes 529 A.2d 434 (N.J. 1987); In re Farrell, 529 A.2d 404 (N.J. 
1987). 
60. Farrell, 529 A.2d at 414 ("We believe that this tradition of respect for and 
confidence in the family should ground our approach to the treatment of the sick."). 
61. !d. 
HeinOnline -- 33 St. Louis U. L.J. 586 1988-1989
586 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL (Vol. 33:575 
dence of what the patient would have wanted. Instead, they must sim-
ply show the ability to· do the best they can under the circumstances, 
and to make good faith decisions based on their knowledge of the fam-
ily member.62 
Some state statutes also recognize the family as primary decision-
maker without court intervention. "Substituted consent" statutes enu-
merate a priority list of persons the provider must turn to for consent to 
treatment.63 Statutes vary regarding the conditions in which the surro-
gate may also authorize the termination of life-sustaining treatment.64 
Informed consent and living will statutes may also be a source of au-
thority for the family surrogate to request the termination of life-sus-
taining treatment. Additionally,' a durable power of attorney may also 
specify a family member (or friend) as the proxy for medical decisions. 
Of course, if the family disagrees or demonstrates bad faith, or no fam-
ily member is available, the family cannot be relied on as the surrogate 
decisionmaker. 
The next most likely approach will be the appointment of a guard-
ian or conservator. All states and the District of Columbia have stat-
utes that provide for such appointment, but the statutes differ as to 
whether they specify authority for health care decisions.611 Either case 
law or statute will provide that the guardian may have the authority to 
make decisions about the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining 
treatment without court ratification or review.66 However, some guardi-
anship statutes reserve "life and death" medical decisions for the 
court.67 
Even in those states in which the court does not routinely require 
court approval, there will be disputed cases.68 At such times, the court 
1-'4'''1' 
62. !d. Courts in Arizona, California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Massachu-
setts, Tennessee, Virginia, and Washington also recognize the family as the primary 
decisionmaker. See AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF RETIRED PERSONS: LEGAL COUNSEL 
FOR THE ELDERLY, DECISION-MAKING, INCAPACITY, AND THE ELDERLY 111 (1987) 
[hereinafter LEGAL COUNSEL FoR THE ELDERLY]. But cf In re O'Connor, 531 N.E.2d 
607 (N.Y. 1988) (the court required clear and convincing evidence, but did not recog-
nize application of the family's substituted judgment). 
63. LEGAL COUNSEL FOR THE ELDERLY, supra note 62, at 111-12. 
64. E.g., N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2965 (McKinney Supp. 1988). The New 
York statute provides the authority for family members to consent to DNR orders. 
Additionally, the New York State Department of Health's pamphlet, Do Not Resusci-
tate Orders: A Guide for Patients and Families, is distributed to all patients upon their 
admission to a hospital or nursing home. 
65. LEGAL COUNSEL FOR THE ELDERLY, supra note 62, at 112. Ohio requires 
that the court make the decision. /d. Civil rules of procedure also provide for the ap-
pointment of a guardian ad litem to represent the interest of the incompetent patient in 
health care decisionmaking cases. 
66. !d. 
67. /d. 
68. When a physician's personal or religious beliefs conflict with a patient's or 
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will either approve ~ surrogate's decision or make the treatment deci-
sion directly. When the treatment decision involves the institutionalized 
patient who was never competent, the court may take an active role.89 
Over the last few years, other alternatives have emerged that help 
assure that the interests of the patient are protected. There has been 
heightened interest in the use of institutional ethics committees for 
resolving the complex issues raised by foregoing life-sustaining treat-
ment. These committees, with a diverse membership of professionals, 
such as physicians, nurses, ethicists, and attorneys, along with the pub-
lic, could advise on various ethical and social considerations surround-
ing treatment decisions.70 Although a few courts have looked to progno-
sis committees to verify the medical condition of an incompetent 
patient, case law and statutes do not grant ethics committees authority 
to serve as the surrogate decisionmaker for the incompetent patient. As 
ethics committees develop in more institutional settings, they should 
take on a more active role in facilitating decisionmaking outside the 
courtroom. 
Another alternative explored for assuring the protection of pa-
surrogate's decision to terminate life-sustaining treatment, the physician may transfer 
the patient to another physician, subject to liability for abandonment if appropriate 
arrangements for transfer are not made in good faith. Both common law and living will 
statutes provide for such an accommodation. 
Should the health care institution have the same right when its objections are 
based on ethical and religious principles-and not based on the unrealistic fear of lia-
bility or convenience? To date, the courts are split on this "accommodation." See 
Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 497 N.E.2d 626 (Mass. 1986) (requiring hospi-
tal, which refused to remove feeding tube for ethical reasons, to cooperate in transfer-
ring the patient to another facility); Delio v. Westchester County Medical Center, 516 
N.Y.S.2d 677 (App. Div. 1987) (transfer to another facility was arranged when hospi-
tal, ordered to either remove artificial feeding and hydration tubes from patient or 
assist in his transfer to his home or another facility, refused to remove the tubes). But 
cf In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434 (N.J. 1987) (refusing to force transfer of nursing home 
patient whose family won right to have her feeding tube removed in contradiction to 
nursing home's policy written after her arrival); In re Requena, 517 A.2d 886 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1986) (denying hospital's request to have severely neurologically 
impaired patient either fed artificially, discharged or transferred), affd 517 A.2d 869 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986) (per curiam); THE HASTINGS CENTER GUIDELINES, 
supra note 26, at 138. 
In practice, it may become more difficult for the patient or the institution to find 
another facility willing to accept the patient. As more facilities address the issue of 
transferability in advance, they may set policies that prohibit the removal of feeding 
tubes. Consequently, this may prevent patients from being able to exercise the rights 
that courts and legislatures have now granted. 
69. See, e.g., Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 370 
N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977). 
70. See PRESIDENT's COMM'N, supra note 24, at 163. Maryland law requires that 
each acute care hospital have a "patient care advisory committee" to advise on difficult 
treatment decisions. Mo. HEALTH-GEN. CooE ANN. § 19-370 to -374 (1981 & Supp. 
1988). 
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tients' rights is the "surrogates committee." This committee provides 
surrogate decisionmakers for those incompetent patients who lack fam-
ily.71 Whether the "stranger" surrogate should have more limited dis-
cretion and be subject to closer review than a family surrogate is still 
open to question. Clearly, the patient's health care provider should not 
act as the surrogate, unless the patient had previously designated the 
provider to act in that role. Even though surrogate committees are a 
positive step in assuring the rights of the incompetent patient, mecha-
nisms must continue to develop for protecting these rights in the most 
effective and efficient manner. 
B. Decisionmaking Standards 
At this point it is appropriate to return to the case of Karen Quin-
lan, a young adult who was in a persistent vegetative state.72 In 1975, 
her father first petitioned a New Jersey court to be appointed her 
guardian for permission to withdraw her from a respirator.78 Mr. Quin-
lan did not, however, request the removal of her feeding tube.74 Her 
attending physicians and the hospital would not remove the respirator 
because they deemed it contrary to medical, ethical, and legal stan-
dards. They feared both criminal and civil liability as well.711 
Ultimately, the New Jersey Supreme Court decided that Karen, if 
competent, could have exercised her constitutional right of privacy to 
refuse what appeared at the time to be life-sustaining treatment.76 This 
right, which outweighed any state interest, would nevertheless be lost 
unless it could be exercised by another on her behalf. The court set out 
the following balancing test: "the State's interest contra weakens and 
the individual's right to privacy grows as the degree of bodily invasion 
increases and the prognosis dims."77 Her treatment was sufficiently in-
vasive and her condition and prognosis sufficiently dim so as to allow 
the termination of life-sustaining treatment. If Karen's guardian, fam-
71. THE HASTINGS CENTER GUIDELINES, supra note 26, at 25-26. A recent New 
York statute authorizes such a committee on a demonstration basis in two geographic 
areas. The committee, which would be interdisciplinary and work through four-member 
panels, would first assess whether the patient was incapable of making treatment deci-
sions. If so, the panel would apply the best interest standard to determine whether or 
not to proceed with treatment. N.Y. MENTAL Hva. LAW §§ 80.01, 80.05 (McKinney 
Supp. 1988). For a one-year evaluation of the program, see Sundram, Informed Con-
sent for Major Medical Treatment of Mentally Disabled People, 318 NEw ENG. J. 
MED. 1368 (1988). 
72. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 654 (N.J.). 
73. /d. at 657-58. 
74. /d. at 647. 
75. /d. 
76. Id. at 664. 
77. /d. See Capron, supra note 14, for a critique of this "waxing-and-waning" 
right to privacy. 
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ily, and attending physicians concurred, and an "ethics committee"78 
confirmed that no reasonable possibility existed of recovery to a sapient 
state, then the respirator could be withdrawn, and all parties would be 
immune from civil and criminal liability.79 
Since the Quinlan case, most state courts have considered cases 
involving formerly competent persons who are terminally ill or in a per-
sistent vegetative state. A few cases have involved the chronically ill 
who may lack decisionmaking capacity because of senility, but are not 
unconscious or facing life-threatening conditions.80 A few more cases 
have dealt with the mentally retarded, or the "never competent" pa-
tient.81 From these cases, decisionmaking standards for the termination 
of treatment for the incompetent patient have emerged. 
Most jurisdictions that have addressed decisionmaking criteria 
have adopted the "substituted judgment" standard.82 This standard fo-
cuses on what the incompetent patient wo~ld have decided, if the pa-
tient were capable of communicating her own decision. Generally, the 
application of substituted judgment necessitates that the patient had 
been competent at one time and had in some manner expressed her 
preferences or values concerning life-sustaining treatment.83 Although 
this may be a difficult task, most jurisdictions cling to this approach as 
the best way to preserve the right to self-determination of the incompe-
tent patient. The best evidence avail~ble niay consist of conversations 
with family, friends, and physicians. A patient's personal beliefs, val-
ues, religious principles, and even consistent attitudes about past medi-
cal care may be relevant when attempting to evaluate how the patient 
would judge whether to forego life-sustaining treatment.84 It is rare, 
; 1 h: 
78. The committee was, in fact, to function as a prognosis committee. In re 
Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 672. 
79. Contrary to all predictions, once the respirator was removed, Karen Quinlan 
remained alive for almost ten years. 
80. See, e.g., In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985); see also infra notes I 08-
66 and accompanying text. 
81. Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 
(Mass. 1977) (court acted as the surrogate decisionmaker, determining that a severely 
retarded patient with leukemia would have refused chemotherapy based on limited 
prognosis and trauma caused by pain and suffering associated with treatment). 
82. Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674 (Ariz. 1987) (en bane); John F. Ken-
nedy Hosp. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1984); Brophy v. New England Sinai 
Hosp., 497 N.E.2d 626 (Mass. 1986); In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434 (N.J. 1987); In re 
Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985). But cf. In re O'Connor, 531 N.E.2d 607 (N.Y. 
1988). 
83. U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, LIFE-SUSTAINING 
TECHNOLOGIES AND THE ELDERLY 118 (1987) (hereinafter LIFE-SUSTAINING TECH-
NOLOGIES). But cf. Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 370 
N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977) (applying the substituted judgment test for severely mentally 
retarded man who had never been competent). 
84. LIFE-SUSTAINING TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 83, at 118-19. 
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however, for substituted judgment to function as a purely subjective 
test. 
"In treatment decisions made in the name of incompetent patients, 
no matter how much evidence we have of subjective intent and ac-
tual wishes or how well the guardian knew the patient, and how 
well-intentioned the patient's guardian, family and physician may 
be, there will always be some residual doubt that the decision ex-
presses or effectuates the patient's right of self-determination. In less 
optimal circumstances, the doubt is greater. As doubt grows, factors 
other than those relating solely to the patient's wishes or views nec-
essarily intrude upon decision making. " 811 
New York courts have rejected the substituted judgment standard, 
holding that there must be "clear and convincing" evidence of an in-
competent patient's previously expressed wishes in order to decline life-
sustaining treatment.86 A signed "advanced directive" in which the pa-
tient, while competent, expresses his wishes with respect to life-sus-
taining treatment will satisfy this evidentiary standard.87 Thirty-eight 
states and the District of Columbia now have enacted natural death, 
living will, or death-with-dignity statutes that grant statutory recogni-
tion to such advanced directives.88 Even in those states without these 
statutes, the courts have viewed the existence of such a directive as 
strong evidence of the patient's wishes.89 
Typically, living will statutes provide for refusing life-sustaining 
treatment when the patient's condition becomes "terminal" or death is 
"imminent." Statutes take varied approaches to defining what consti-
tutes "life-sustaining" treatment. Some statutes specifically include ar-
tificial feeding and hydration and others specifically omit such proce-
dures.90 All statutes provide for detailed procedures for executing the 
advanced directive and many include a model form to be filled out by 
the person when competent. Perhaps most significantly, all statutes pro-
vide immunity for health care providers who comply in good faith with 
85. In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 455 (N.J. 1987) (Handler, J., concurring). 
86. In re O'Connor, 531 N.E.2d 607 (N.Y. 1988) (stating the policy that "if an 
error occurs it should be made on the side of life."). For a more in-depth discussion of 
In re O'Connor, see infra notes I 52-66. But cf In re Beth Israel Medical Center, 519 
N.Y.S.2d 511 (Sup. Ct. 1987) (applying a "best interests" hybrid test to the decision 
whether an incompetent elderly woman could forego life-saving amputation of a gan-
grenous leg). 
87. In re O'Connor, 531 N.E.2d at 613. 
88. For a state-by-state analysis, see HANDBOOK, supra note 3; see also Gelfand, 
Living Will Statutes: The First Decade, 1987 Wis. L. REv. 737. 
89. Gelfand, supra note 88. 
90. For example, Missouri's Jiving will statute specifically excludes any proce-
dure that provides nutrition or hydration from its definition of a "death-prolonging" 
procedure. Mo. ANN. STAT. §459.010(3) (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1989). 
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a properly executed living will.91 
The enactment of a living will statute may be more symbolic than 
either necessary or effective in guaranteeing the right to refuse treat-
ment to the incompetent patient. As noted above, because the statute 
may only go into effect when death is imminent, the statute fails to 
cover the patient in a persistent vegetative state, as in the case of 
Karen Quinlan. Furthermore, many of the statutes are ambiguous in 
their language about which "life-sustaining" treatments may be with-
held or withdrawn-most notably artificial food and hydration and 
antibiotics.92 
On a positive note, the statutes do codify the state's recogni-
tion-with or without a state court ruling-of the right of the patient 
to terminate treatment over the state's interest in preserving life. Im-
munity for health care 'providers from civil and criminal liability should 
also encourage more dialogue between patients and providers over long-
term treatment plans.93 
In any case, the living will does not represent the exclusive vehicle 
for exercising the right to forego treatment. Another statutory alterna-
tive gaining popularity is the Durable Power of Attorney (DPA). All 
states and the District of Columbia have statutes which enable a com-
petent person to appoint a proxy decisionmaker when the individual no 
longer remains competent to make decisions.94 Most state legislatures 
did not create DPAs in order to specifically deal with medical decision-
making, but rather with financial matters. Yet, in a recent case, the 
New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the proxy's right to act on behalf 
of a persistent vegetative patient, to have the nursing home provider 
remove her nasogastric feeding tube.911 
A number of states have recently amended their general DPA 
statutes or passed new statutes that specifically allow for a proxy to 
make medical decisions.96 Any competent person may appoint a proxy 
to act on her behalf once declared incapable of making her own medi-
cal decisions. A proxy may have the power to provide, withhold, or 
withdraw consent to specific medical procedures. These medical proce-
dures include the administration of CPR, antibiotics, artificial feeding 
and hydration, and blood transfusions. The proxy may also have the 
91. See HANDBOOK, supra note 3; Gelfand, supra note 88. 
92. See HANDBOOK, supra note 3. 
93. In fact, over two out of three physicians surveyed in 1988 believe that they 
should have living wills available in their offices. AMERICAN MEDICAL AssOCIATION, 
AMA SURVEYS OF PHYSICIAN AND PUBLIC OPINION ON HEALTH CARE ISSUES 25-26 
(1988). 
94. For an excellent discussion and references on the durable power of attorney, 
see E. COHEN, APPOINTING A PROXY FOR HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS (1987) (unpub-
lished manuscript) (available from the Society for the Right to Die). 
95. In re Peter, 529 A.2d 419 (N.J. 1987). 
96. See E. CoHEN, supra note 94. 
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power to interpret a living will and, if necessary, resort to obtaining 
court authorization regarding treatment decisions or to request civil 
damages for not honoring the proxy's decision.97 
Most patients do not leave explicit instructions nor execute ad-
vanced directives.98 If there is no advanced directive nor other reliable 
evidence of the patient's wishes, the surrogate may utilize the "best 
interest" standard. This traditional guardianship standard allows the 
surrogate to objectively weigh the benefits and burdens of treatment to 
determine how a reasonable person in the patient's circumstances 
would promote her well being.99 Under no circumstances should the 
social worth of the patient enter into the formulation. This remains 
particularly critical when the. patient is mentally retarded or elderly 
and institutionalized.100 
The decisionmaker determines whether the burdens of the treat-
ment outweigh the benefits of the treatment, weighing such factors as: 
(1) the age of the patient; 
(2) the patient's life expectancy with and without treatment; 
(3) the anticipated degree of pain with and without treatment; 
( 4) the extent of the patient's physical and mental disability; 
(5) the quality of life to the patient with and without treatment 
(any pleasure, enjoyment, or satisfaction to be gained from 
continued existence); 
(6) the risks, side effects, and the degree of invasiveness of treat-
ment; and 
(7) the type of care required if life is prolonged compared to the 
care required presently.101 
97. /d. 
98. In 1982, a Lou Harris poll revealed that only about one-third of the popula-
tion had given any instructions on how they wanted to be treated in the event they were 
incapable of making their own decisions. Of those, only about one-fourth had put their 
instructions in any written form. See 2 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF 
ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH, MAKING HEALTH 
CARE DECISIONS 241-42, Appendix B (1982). 
99. See, e.g., Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674 (Ariz. 1987) (en bane) (up-
holding a trial court determination that a surrogate could direct the removal of a nasa-
gastric tube based on the "best interest" standard). 
I 00. See infra notes 108-66 and accompanying text. 
101. See In re Beth Israel Medical Center, 519 N.Y.S.2d 511, 517 (Sup. Ct. 
1987). The New York court considered, in addition to objective factors, 1) the religious 
or ethical beliefs of the patient, 2) the views of those close to her, and 3) statements, if 
any, made by the patient that indicate her views on life-sustaining treatment. 
In practice, a few courts have blurred the distinction between the substituted judg-
ment and the best interest standards, utilizing both in the same case. Foody v. 
Manchester Memorial Hosp., 482 A.2d 713 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1984); In re Torres, 357 
N.W.2d 332 (Minn. 1984); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985). This has been 
particularly evident in cases involving the chronically ill and institutionalized patient. 
Perhaps this is because both the wishes of the patient subjectively and the best interest 
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Although a presumption for treatment may exist, the court has recog-
nized that it is not always in a patient's best interest to continue life-
sustaining treatment.102 
Recently, ethical guidelines have emerged for applying the "best 
interest" standard to important categories of patients.108 For the termi-
nally ill patient two major considerations exist: (1) whether foregoing 
treatment will allow the patient to avoid the burden of prolonged dying 
with pain and suffering;10" and (2) whether the patient has the poten-
tial benefit of achieving some satisfaction if she survives for a longer 
period of time. 106 
For the patient with irreversible loss of consciousness, the benefit/ 
burden analysis is different. These patients do not experience pain. The 
only possible benefit to these patients is that they may have been mis-
diagnosed and might regain consciousness. Thus, the major considera-
tions are whether a reasonable person in the patient's circumstances 
would find that this benefit, as well as the benefit to the family and 
friends, is outweighed by the emotional suffering and financial burden 
of treatment.106 
For the patient with the severe illness or a disabling condition that 
is irreversible, the major consideration is whether termination of treat-
ment would be preferable to a patient's life largely devoid of opportuni-
ties to achieve satisfaction or full of pain or suffering with no corre-
sponding benefits. 107 
IV. THE SEVERELY DEBILITATED .PATIENT: THE EVOLUTION OF 
LEGAL STANDARDS FOR THE INSTITUTIONALIZED ELDERLY 
How far are we willing to extend the rig.ht of a surrogate to refuse 
of the patient objectively through the eyes of a decisionmaker may coincide with the 
decision to terminate life-sustaining treatment. 
102. Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674 (Ariz. 1987) (en bane). 
103. THE HASTINGS CENTER GUIDELINES, supra note 26, at 28. 
104. /d. 
105. Id. at 28-29. 
106. /d. at 29. 
107. /d. On the other hand, some patients or surrogates may want all treatment 
provided, even when the provider deems it medically inappropriate under the circum-
stances. If a patient or her surrogate has the right to refuse life- sustaining treatment, 
does she also have a corollary right to demand that the provider utilize all means to 
keep the patient alive? When can the health care professional and the institution say 
"No More" without risking liability? How will the standard of care emerge in the 
future for the hopelessly ill? Will a consensus emerge in which it is deemed unjust in 
our society to provide unnecessary and inappropriate treatment (over and above sup-
portive care) to those who have no reasonable chance of recovery or return to a sapient 
life? See Brody, Ethical Questions Raised by the Persistent Vegetative Patient, HAs-
TINGS CENTER REPORT, Feb.-Mar. 1988, at 33. To date, there is little guidance on this 
issue. 
HeinOnline -- 33 St. Louis U. L.J. 594 1988-1989
594 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 33:575 
treatment for a patient who is neither terminally ill nor in a persistent 
vegetative state, but rather is chronically ill and senile?108 Typically, 
this is the elderly patient institutionalized in a nursing home. How can 
we quantify benefit and burden for this patient? How much signifi-
cance should we attach to recovery, side effects, intrusiveness and se-
verity of treatment, and ability to cooperate in care?109 And how will 
these decisions be influenced by cost implications? How can we con-
tinue to avoid making judgments about the "social worth" of these 
patients? 
To date, only a few courts have expressly examined the special 
circumstances of these severely debilitated patients. Standards have 
been borrowed from those cases involving comatose, vegetative, or ter-
minally ill patients. Yet, these are harder cases to consider. 
Terminally ill patients, by definition, have a short time to live. The 
court in In re Grant110 held that a patient need not be comatose or in 
pain before the right to withhold life-sustaining treatment arises: 
Certainly, the amount of pain endured by a dying patient is a signifi-
cant factor, ... but not the only factor. The individual's right to die 
with dignity must not be ignored. As one court has noted, a termi-
nally ill patient may wish to avoid not only prolonged suffering, but 
also "[t]he ultimate horror ... of being maintained in limbo, in a 
sterile room, by machines controlled by strangers."111 
A patient in a persistent vegetative state retains only the most primitive 
brain functions: heartbeat, breathing, the sleepjwake cycle, and some 
reflexive movements.112 Since a person in a vegetative state has essen-
tially no interaction with his environment, the patient receives virtually 
no benefits from life.113 
These judgments become more unclear, however, when applied to 
patients who are neither comatose nor terminally ill. If the patient re-
mains somewhat cognitive of and responsive to her environment, and if 
death does not appear imminent, the benefit-burden determination is 
difficult to quantify. To date, the courts have failed to clarify the signif-
icance of these factors. 
The greatest danger in not considering all relevant factors is the 
possibility that the decisionmaker will make quality of life judgments 
108. See infra notes 109-66. 
109. The court considered similar factors in Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 
674 (Ariz. 1987) (en bane). 
110. 747 P.2d 445 (Wash. 1987) (en bane) (the patient's mother sought an order 
authorizing the future withholding of mechanical and artificial life-sustaining proce-
dures, including artificial nutrition). 
Ill. /d. at 450-51 (quoting In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332, 340 (Minn. 1984)). 
112. Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580, 582 (D.R.I. 1988). 
113. See In Re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.) (opining that most people would 
find such an existence "unendurable"), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). 
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based on social worth. These quality judgments are especially danger· 
ous when age serves as a factor, for there may be an underlying feeling 
that the patient "has lived long enough." Yet age so often plays a fac· 
tor in the medical decisionmaking process. For example, in the 
Saikewicz decision,114 one of the factors weighing against chemother· 
apy was Saikewicz' age, because "people of [his] age do not tolerate 
the chemotherapy as well as younger people and . . . the chance of a 
remission is decreased."1111 The court specifically stated, however, that 
"[a]ge is irrelevant, of course, to the questions of the value or quality 
of life. " 116 
In another case, In re Spring, 117 a Massachusetts court held that 
dialysis treatment could be terminated on behalf of a seventy·nine year 
old senile patient who .still retained some ,ability to interact with his 
environment. The court did not base its decision explicitly on the age of 
the patient, but on his inability to understand and cooperate with his 
treatment, and on the burdensome nature of dialysis. 
Other courts are even less clear about the role of age as both a 
medical and objective quality of life factor. For example, in In re 
Hier, 118 the court discussed the medical implications of the patient's 
age, but then characterized her as "a ninety-two year old person who is 
seriously ill and for whom life has little left to offer."119 Additionally, 
in In re Beth Israel Medical Cen.ter,120 the court held that the burdens 
of an emergency amputation for an elderly patient outweighed the ben· 
efits of continued life.121 The court then noted that "[l]ife has no mean· 
ing for her. " 122 
Although courts find it difficult to tell whether age is a factor in an 
objective quality of life judgment, some courts have apparently recog-
nized this danger and have nearly "bent over backwards" to avoid such 
judgments. In confronting this problem one~ court noted: 
[A] distinction must be drawn between those who are unable to care 
114. Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 
(Mass. 1977). 
115. /d. at 432 n.17. 
116. /d. 
117. 405 N .E.2d 115 (Mass. 1980). 
118. 464 N.E.2d 959, 964 (Mass. 1984) (patient's age of ninety-two made "the 
proposed gastrostomy substantially more onerous or burdensome ... than it would be 
for a younger, healthier person"). But cf In re Clark, 510 A.2d 136 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
Ch. Div. 1986) (holding benefits of continued life outweighed burdens of enterostomy 
surgery to maintain artificial feeding for forty-five year old patient with organic brain 
damage), later proceeding, 515 A.2d 276 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1986), affd, 524 
A.2d 448 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987). 
119. 464 N.E.2d at 965. 
120. 519 N.Y.S.2d 511 (Sup. Ct. 1987). 
121. Id. at 517 ("[S]uch prolongation of her life would be simply cruel."). 
122. /d. 
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for themselves due to infirmities of illness, age or other physical disa-
bilities and those who are brain-dead or terminally ill, without hope 
of recovery, and are being kept alive solely by use of artificial means 
In the former, it is a function of humanity to care for those who 
are unable to care for themselves by reason of illness, age or infirmi-
ties. This function of humanity springs not from a consideration of 
the quality of life of the ill, but rather from the human spirit. It is 
the quintessential difference between man ... and the lower forms 
of animal life.128 
The Supreme Court of New Jersey has applied special standards 
to an elderly, severely debilitated person. In re Conroy124 involved a 
request by the guardian of an eighty-four year old, severely debilitated 
nursing home patient to remove a nasogastric feeding tube. The lower 
court had denied permission, holding that the right to terminate life-
sustaining treatment on behalf of an incompetent patient was limited to 
comatose, brain-dead, or vegetative patients.1u The New Jersey court, 
in considering this issue, discussed the special problems involved with 
elderly nursing home residents.126 First, the court recognized New 
Jersey's strong public policy in favor of protecting the rights of nursing 
home patients,127 and restricted its holding to them because of a num-
ber of state statutes that applied specifically to this population.128 The 
court noted that an elderly institutionalized patient, "whatever his 
physical and mental limitations and life expectancy, has the same right 
to receive [or decline] medical treatment as a competent young person 
whose physical functioning is basically intact."129 The court then went 
on to discuss the significant differences between Quinlan-type patients 
and Conroy-type patients. The court noted that: 
We now are faced with [a case involving] elderly, formerly compe-
tent nursing-home residents who, unlike Karen Quinlan, are awake 
and conscious and can interact with their environment to a limited 
extent, but whose mental and physical functioning is severely and 
permanently impaired and whose life expectancy, even with the 
treatment, is relatively short. The capacities of such people, while 
123. In re Vogel, 512 N.Y.S.2d 622, 624 (Super. Ct. 1986). The New York 
Court of Appeals in In re O'Connor, 531 N.E.2d 607, 614-15 (N.Y. 1988), expressed a 
similar sentiment. See infra notes 152-66 and accompanying text. 
124. 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985). 
125. /d. at 1219. 
126. /d. 
127. Id. at 1224. 
128. /d. at 1219 n.l. 
129. /d. at 1226 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:270-1 (West 1986)). The New 
Jersey statute states: "[l]t is the public policy of this State to secure for elderly pa-
tients, residents and clients of health care facilities serving their specialized needs and 
problems, the same civil and human rights guaranteed to all citizens." /d. 
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significantly diminished, are not as limited as those of irreversibly 
comatose persons, and their deaths, while no longer distant, may not 
be imminent. Large numbers of aged, chronically ill, institutional-
ized persons fall within this general category.180 
597 
The New Jersey Supreme Court also highlighted the special 
problems of elderly patients who are institutionalized by noting: 
First, residents of nursing homes are a particularly vulnerable 
population. [They] are often quite elderly, ... suffer from chronic or 
crippling disabilities and mental impairments and need assistance in 
activities of daily living. 
Second, [they] are often without any, surviving family .... 
Thus, the involvement of caring family members that was an inte-
gral part of the decision-making process in Quinlan may not be a 
realistic possibility for many nursing-home residents.131 
The court also noted that physicians are less available at nursing 
homes, and that nursing homes suffer from unique problems, including 
the problem of patient abuse.132 The court went on to hold that 
"[b]ecause of the special vulnerability of the mentally and physically 
impaired, elderly persons· in nursing homes ... , life-sustaining treat-
ment should not be withdrawn or withheld ... in· the absence of a 
guardian's decision, made in accordance with the procedure outlined 
below .... " 138 
The elaborate procedure that the New Jersey Supreme Court fol-
lowed involved, in part, a set of three standards for decisionmaking. 134 
The first standard is the "subjective test" which determines what the 
patient would have done if able to choose for herself.m Under this test, 
the decisionmaker weighs evidence ofthe patient's expressed intentions, 
the patient's religious convictions, the patient's consistent pattern of 
conduct, and the condition, treatment, and prognosis of the patient. 136 
If not enough reliable evidence exists to satisfy the subjective 
test, 137 then the decisionmaker must apply one of two objective tests.188 
The "limited objective" test applies "when there is some trustworthy 
130. In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1228-29 (N.J. 1985). 
131. Id. at 1237. 
132. /d. at 1237-38. 
133. /d. at 1240. 
134. /d. The court also required an initial judicial determination of 
incompetency. 
135. /d. at 1229. 
136. /d. at 1229-31; see supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text. 
137. The court noted that "in the absence of adequate proof of the patient's 
wishes, it is naive to pretend that the right to self-determination serves as a basis for 
substituted decision-making." 486 A.2d at 1231. 
138. /d. at 1232. The two objective tests are, namely, the "limited objective" and 
"pure objective" tests. 
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evidence that the patient would have refused treatment, and [where] it 
is clear that the burdens. of the patient's continued life with treatment 
outweigh the benefits of that life for him."139 The court explained that 
the patient must be suffering continued and unavoidable pain, and that 
this burden must "markedly outweigh any physical pleasure, emotional 
enjoyment, or intellectual satisfaction that the patient may still be able 
to derive from life. " 1" 0 
If there is no evidence of the patient's wishes, the "pure objective" 
test applies. Under this standard, the benefits of life with treatment 
must be outweighed by the burdens.141 A further requirement, however, 
is that "the recurring, unavoidable and severe pain of the patient's life 
with the treatment should be such that the effect of administering life-
sustaining treatment would be inhumane."142 
The Conroy court cautioned that the adoption of these tests in no 
way served to: 
[a]uthorize decision-making based on assessments of the personal 
worth or social utility of another's life, or the value of that life to 
others. We do not believe that it would be appropriate ... to desig-
nate a person with the authority to determine that someone else's life 
is not worth living simply because, to that person, the patient's 
"quality of life" or value to society seems negligible. 143 
In applying these standards, the court denied the request to remove the 
feeding tube, finding none of the tests satisfied.1"" The record failed to 
establish a "clear" intent to decline life-sustaining treatment, and no 
conclusive evidence that Ms. Conroy experienced pain, distress, or 
thirst. 1411 In practice, it is often difficult to obtain such evidence146 from 
incompetent, bedridden patients. 
There are limits to the Conroy analysis. For the tests to apply, the 
patient must: ( 1) be elderly and incompetent; (2) be a nursing home 
resident; (3) suffer from severe, permanent mental and physical disabil-
ities; and ( 4) have a life expectancy of one year or less.147 Some of 
these requirements have been modified in more recent New Jersey 
139. /d. 
140. /d. 
141. /d. 
142. /d. The court noted that life-sustaining treatment should not be withheld or 
withdrawn even under the pure objective test where the patient had previously ex-
pressed the desire that she be kept alive, regardless of any amount of pain. /d. 
143. !d. at 1232-33. 
144. /d. 
145. /d. at 1242-43. 
146. See Merritt, supra note 6, at 729 (difficulty of demonstrating sufficient evi-
dence to meet tests). 
147. In re Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1232. 
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cases. For example, the court in In re Peterus held that the Conroy 
subjective test "is applicable in every surrogate-refusal-of-treatment 
case, regardless of the patient's medical condition or life-expec-
tancy."u9 The one-year life-expectancy requirement did not apply in 
determining whether life-sustaining treatment may be withheld from a 
patient in a persistent vegetative state, because the requirement has 
meaning only when a possibility of some benefit from continued exis-
tence exists.uo Conroy's objective tests have also been criticized for 
their focus on the patient's pain, in part because the availability of 
pain-relieving medication may nullify the importance of this factor. 1111 
Perhaps the focus on pain was an indirect attempt to limit the effect of 
societal judgments about the worth of an elderly, debilitated person's 
life. 
Most recently, in In re O'Connor/52 New York's highest court re-
fused to prevent the insertion of a nasogastric tube in an elderly, insti-
tutionalized patient. Mary O'Connor was a seventy-seven year old 
stroke victim, conscious but severely demented, unresponsive, unable to 
feed herself, and incapable of making medical decisions. 153 When the 
hospital requested permission from her daughters to insert a nasogas-
tric tube, they both refused.154 The daughters claimed that their 
mother had expressed that she did not want to be maintained by artifi-
cial means or to become a burden to her family. 155 The hospital con-
sulted its ethics committee, and based on Mrs. O'Connor's medical 
condition, the committee advised that the nasogastric tube feeding 
should not be withheld. 158 
148. 529 A.2d 419 (N.J. 1987). 
149. ld. at 425. 
150. ld. at 424. 
151. See Merritt, supra note 6, at 729 ("The Conroy limited objective and pure-
objective tests are inadequate because they ultimately focus on physical pain"); see 
also Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1247 (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
("'Pain' thus eclipses a whole cluster of other human values that have a proper place 
in the subtle weighing that will ultimately determine how life should end."). 
152. 531 N.E.2d 607 (N.Y. 1988). 
153. ld. at 609. 
154. /d. The daughters were both nurses and had arranged for a signed docu-
ment to be placed in their mother's medical file in which they stated that it was their 
mother's "expressed wishes" not to have life support started or maintained. /d. Perhaps 
it was the existence of this document that prompted the hospital, Westchester County 
Medical Center, to seek consent prior to insertion of the feeding tube. Furthermore, the 
hospital had previously been a party to another case in which it was required to either 
withdraw a nasogastric tube from a patient in a persistent vegetative state or arrange 
for appropriate transfer. See Delio v. Westchester County Medical Center, 516 
N.Y.S.2d 677 (App. Div. 1987). In practice, it may be rare for a hospital or nursing 
home to seek permission prior to the insertion of a feeding tube. 
155. In re O'Connor, 531 N.E.2d at 609. 
156. /d. 
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The hospital sought court authorization to insert the nasogastric 
tube.1117 Although the patient had not specifically. articulated her posi-
tion with respect to artificial feeding and hydration, the lower court 
found that New York's standard for clear and convincing evidence had 
been met by her "expressed wishes" to decline life support.1118 
Following expedited review by the Appellate Division, which af-
firmed the lower court opinion, the hospital appealed to the New York 
Court of Appeals. In a 5-2 opinion, New York's highest court reversed, 
holding that her prior expressions failed to meet its clear and convinc-
ing evidence test. Based on Mrs. O'Connor's CQndition, the court held 
that the nasogastric tubes could not be withheld because: "Every per-
son has a right to life, and no one should be denied essential medical 
care unless the evidence clearly and convincingly shows that the patient 
intended to decline the treatment under some particular circum-
stances."1119 Such evidence would include a specific writing, such as a 
living will or durable power of attorney, which would demonstrate a 
"firm and settled commitment"180 to decline medical treatment, not es-
tablished by casual remarks made to family members and friends. 181 
In rejecting the substituted· judgment standard adopted by most 
other jurisdictions, 182 the court appeared to distrust the family because 
it might impose quality of life judgments contrary to interests of the 
patient. The court held that "no person or court should substitute its 
judgment as to what would be an acceptable quality of life for an-
other."188 Yet the New York court did exactly this. It imposed its qual-
ity of life judgment upon Mrs; O'Connor. It was the court's position 
that her medical condition did: not justify·the withholding of a nasogas-
tric tube. The court determined that Mrs. O'Connor's family could not 
157. /d. 
158. ld. at 611. For example, her daughters testified that she had repeatedly 
stated that she did no.t want to be kept alive by artificial means. Furthermore, during 
20 years of hospital employment, a co-worker and long-time friend, as well as her 
daughters, testified that Mrs. O'Connor had stated that it was "monstrous" to be kept 
alive on "machinery, things like that" when one was "not going to get better." After 
nursing her husband and brothers through long illnesses, and upon returning home 
from a hospitalization for a heart attack, she also expressed the position that she never 
wanted life support to maintain her artifically. /d. at 608-11. The lower court con-
cluded that her past expressions plainly covered withholding any form of life-prolong-
ing treatment, even though Mrs. O'Connor had never discussed providing food and 
water with medical assistance, nor had she ever stated that she would adhere to her 
view and decline medical treatment by artificial means if that would produce a painful 
death. 
159. /d. at 613 (citation omitted). 
160. /d. at 613-14. 
161. /d. at 614. Oral evidence would be considered, but would need to meet the 
clear and convincing standard. 
162. See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text. 
163. In re O'Connor, 531 N.E.2d at 615-16. 
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be trusted to take into account her values, personal beliefs, background, 
and her prior statements concerning medical treatment. Nor could they 
serve as the surrogate to exercise her right to refuse the artificial 
feeding. 
Perhaps if Mrs. O'Connor had been terminally ill or in a persis-
tent vegetative state, the outcome would have been different. The court 
observed that: 
Mrs. O'Connor does not have a terminal illness, except in the sense 
that she is aged and infirm. Neither is she in a coma nor vegetative 
state. She is awake and conscious; she can feel pain, responds to 
simple commands, can carry on limited conversations, and is not ex-
periencing any pain. She is simply an elderly person who as a result 
of several strokes suffers certain disabilities, including an inability to 
feed herself or eat in a normal manner .... But that is true of many 
nursing home patients. The key thing that sets her apart-though 
there are likely thousands like her-is her inability to eat or obtain 
nourishment without medical assistance.16' 
Although the court then conceded that Mrs. O'Connor expressed her 
desire not to be kept alive artificially if she could not care for herself, it 
rationalized that the record was not clear whether she might be able in 
the future to obtain food and water without medical assistance. 1611 
Thus, based on her uncertain prognosis, the court did not view 
Mrs. O'Connor's wishes as "clear and convincing" under the 
circumstances.188 
Obviously, the court was reacting to a perceived need to protect 
the institutionalized elderly from potential neglect. Yet, such a reaction 
in this case may be ill-advised. Particularly for those patients with car-
ing and loving family members, the trend should not be to move back 
into the courtroom every time a treatment d~cision needs to be made. 
Of course, as our aging society grows, it is inevitable that more cases 
will involve minimally conscious and severely debilitated, elderly pa-
tients. Hopefully, the courts will discourage, and not encourage, such 
cases when family surrogate decisionmakers are available. For those 
patients without family, the courts, health care providers, and the pub-
lic will struggle to reach consensus on how to establish standards that 
protect such patients from the indifference and abuse that both denies 
some patients necessary treatment while continuing treatment for 
others simply because no one cares enough to let it end. 
CONCLUSION 
In the last decade, the legal and ethical foundations for the right 
164. /d. at 615. 
165. /d. 
166. /d. 
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to forego treatment have been well established. For the competent pa-
tient, the right is relatively easy to apply. For the incompetent patient, 
who is terminally ill or permanently unconscious, the majority of state 
courts that have addressed the issue have moved toward the develop-
ment of decisionmaking standards and a preference that the family, 
and not the court, make treatment decisions on behalf of the patient. 
State legislatures have also made progress in promoting the develop-
ment of advanced directives and the appointment of proxies for medical 
decisions. The next step will be to establish legal standards that protect 
the rights of severely debilitated patients in our aging society. Towards 
that goal, we must all initiate discussions with family, friends, and 
health care providers in order to clarify our position on foregoing life-
sustaining treatment. 
